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 No light will ever be cast in the sybillic twilight that, for us, surrounds the origin and 
nature of religion as long as we insist on approaching it as a single problem requiring 
only a single word for its solution. Thus far no one has been able to offer a definition 
of religion that is both precise and sufficiently comprehensive. No one has been able 
to grasp its ultimate essence (Simmel [1897] 1997:101 emphasis added). 
 
Although Georg Simmel hoped to settle the definition of religion question when he penned 
these lines, the debate was just getting started in the new discipline of sociology. Despite the 
inadequacy of his own solution to the problem, Simmel identified the axes on which the 
debate would turn for the next hundred years. It has continually revolved around the search 
for a definition that is “both precise and sufficiently comprehensive”(101), that is, for a 
definition that is neither too broad nor too narrow. In this paper, I will show that these 
arguments point to a hidden consensus in the debate. Second, Simmel pointed out that 
nobody has been able to grasp the “essence” of religion. Nobody has since, and I will suggest 
that this is because there is no essence of religion  outside the discourse of religion. This 
does not mean, however, that we cannot conceptualize or define “religion” sociologically.   
The literature on the proper definition/conception of religion is enormous, and no 
single discussion can adequately address all of the issues as they appear in a single 
discipline, let alone all of them
ii
. I have chosen to deal with the definition debate in sociology 
for two reasons. First, these debates are useful because they occur within a tradition of 
scholarship that is explicitly non-theological, and thus do not presuppose an ontology 
“behind” religion, as in most of the phenomenological or “sui generis” conceptions of 
religion that are dominant in the academic study of religion (cf. McCutcheon 1997, 
Fitzgerald 2000, Wiebe 1999). Second, I am examining these debates because I think they 
point to an implicit consensus that is useful for a non-essentialist definition of religion.      
After providing an overview of the sociological debate, I will historicize the concept 
of religion, drawing on Wilfred Cantwell Smith's (in)famous book The Meaning and End of 
Religion (1978). I will suggest that once we have properly historicized the concept 
“religion”, there is much to be gained from Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophical 
writings (1968, 1980) in constructing a useful, non-essentialist and sociological definition of 
“religion”. A number of scholars in cognate disciplines (Peter Byrne, Jonathan Z. Smith, 
Timothy Fitzgerald and Benson Saler) have recently made significant contributions to 
non-essentialist conceptions/definitions of religion, some of them directly influenced by 
Wittgenstein. I will use Wittgenstein’s texts to work through what is more adequate and less 
adequate in their approaches to the topic. 
 
The Definitional Debate in Sociology of Religion 
 
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), Durkheim proposes what has since 
become a very influential functional definition of religion in response to early substantive 
definitions that he argues are all too narrow and ethnocentric. In short, the substantive 
definitions exclude too many religions. For example, E.B. Tylor’s definition of religion as 
“belief in spirits” excludes the religion of the Jains, and even more importantly, some 
traditions of Buddhism, which admit of no gods or spirits. Although Durkheim’s assumption 
about the non-theism of Buddhism has been questioned, he anticipates this challenge. He 
argues that even if there were divine beings in Buddhism (such as the Buddha has sometimes 
become), this is a marginal rather than an essential element, “since the practice of the four 
spiritual truths would be possible, even if the memory of him who revealed them were 
completely obliterated”  (1915: 47).  He suggests that “belief in spirits” is an implicitly 
Christian understanding of religion, since Christianity “is inconceivable without the 
ever-present idea of Christ and his ever-practiced cult” (47). 
Durkheim therefore defines religion as: 
...a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, 
things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into one single 
moral community called a Church all who adhere to them (1915:62). 
  The force of this definition, and the rest of the book, is to argue that religion is the 
cohesive force that unites the members of a society in the worship of sacred symbols. As 
Roger O’Toole notes, Durkheim also incorporates a significant substantive element in his 
definition, since he defines religion as “beliefs and practices relative to sacred things”. 
However, in his emphasis on sacred things as symbols that represent the community, the 
substantive element of his definition serves to reinforce the functional (1984:13). 
If Durkheim proposed his functionalist definition of religion because the substantive 
definitions are too narrow, his functional definition, and that of his disciples, is too broad.  
If “religion is as religion does", then we cannot say that there is or ever has been a society 
with no “religion” (Spiro 1966:86). This commits us to the position that religion is found in 
every culture, even before we begin comparative analyses. Secondly, and even more 
important, as Melford Spiro argues, functionalist definitions of religion make it “virtually 
impossible to set any substantive boundary to religion and, thus, to distinguish it from other 
socio-cultural phenomena” (1966:89). Thus, for example, the question of secularization 
becomes virtually invisible, and we have difficulty distinguishing state apparatuses and the 
economy from "religion"
iii
.  
Ultimately it was probably the collapse of structural functionalist theory that made 
the functional definitions seem less plausible. Since the late 1960s, models of society that 
emphasize equilibrium, gradual evolution and reasonably harmonious integration, no longer 
seem adequate. In response to the crisis of functionalist theory, and its definitions of religion, 
substantive definitions enjoyed a remarkable comeback after a long period of disrepute 
(O’Toole 1984:27). Although there may be a broad consensus that substantive definitions 
are preferable, this has by no means led to agreement about what that substantive element 
should be. 
 Convinced neither by functionalist theory, nor by the substantive content of 
Durkheim's definition, several anthropologists began to re-value Tylor’s “belief in spiritual 
beings” definition  (O’Toole 1984:27ff).  Critics took issue with Durkheim’s insistence on 
the sacred/profane distinction, since in many cultures such distinctions do not exist (Worsley 
1968).  Thus, if functional definitions are no longer plausible, and the sacred is a Western 
religious notion, then there is an obvious need to find an alternative way of defining religion. 
While agreeing with Durkheim that "belief in spiritual beings" is a Western 
conception of religion, anthropologists such as Robin Horton and Melford Spiro have argued 
that Tylor’s definition of religion was nonetheless close to the mark (O’Toole 1984:27-36). 
Spiro agrees with Durkheim that there are many problems with using the notion of “spirit” 
as the essence of religion. Many societies think of “spirits” in a way that we would not 
recognize as such, or attribute to “natural” processes things that Westerners would associate 
with the belief in “spirits”. The belief in spirits as the essence of religion is a Western, 
ethnocentric idea that ends up being super-imposed on a wide diversity of beliefs and 
cosmologies. Spiro argues, however, that “superhuman beings” are universal in all religions. 
This being the case, he defines religion as “an institution consisting of culturally patterned 
interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings” (Spiro 1966:96). Spiro argued 
that Durkheim and other Western observers have noticed only the non-theistic nature of élite 
forms of Buddhism, but they are mistaken to suggest that there are no “gods” or "spirits" or 
"superhuman beings" in Theravada Buddhism.  The Buddha is a superhuman being in 
popular forms of the Theravada tradition, and he is not alone– many other superhuman 
beings also populate their cosmology. 
 The matter of Buddhism is far from settled, however, as others have taken issue 
with Spiro’s argument.  Malcolm Hamilton (1995:14-15, 71-79) argues that while 
Theravada Buddhism is a religion, the Buddha is not a “superhuman being” (although he 
may have been), since when he passed into enlightenment, he ceased to exist “as an 
independent ego”. There are superhuman beings, or “spirits” in some expressions of 
Theravada Buddhism, but there are not in other communities of the same tradition– 
including many popular communities (Herbrechtsmeier 1993). As Herbrechtsmeier 
observes, Theravada is not the only Buddhist tradition which denies the existence of "gods",  
“spirits” and “superhuman beings”. Others include the historically important Hinayana 
schools, and the contemporary Rinzai Zen tradition (1993). 
Evidently, belief in “super-human beings” is not essential for defining Buddhism, let 
alone religion in general.  Moreover, Hamilton observes, “super-human” is a very 
ambiguous concept. Who counts as a “super-human”? Many non-religious figures have been 
seen as “superhuman”, and many religious objects, spirits, and symbols are not treated as 
being “above” humans or as “superhuman”– think, for example of the disrespect shown to 
the images of non-compliant saints in popular Catholicism (Hamilton 1995). According to 
Herbrechtsmeier, Spiro’s notion of the “super-human” shows a profound misunderstanding 
of what “human” is in the samsara worldview of the Buddhists. In this belief system, the 
ability to do “wondrous things” does not make a person anything more, or less than, human 
(1993). 
Stark and Bainbridge (1996) have also followed the substantive tradition of Tylor in 
their ‘rational-choice’ models of religion. They make the “supernatural” the essence of 
religion. Religions are “systems of general compensators based on supernatural 
assumptions” (1996:39).  The “supernatural” is then defined as “forces outside or beyond 
nature which can suspend, alter, or ignore physical forces” (39). There are obvious problems 
with this definition as well. Most serious is that they impose, in a distinctly heavy-handed 
manner, Western assumptions about the difference between “nature” (physical forces) and 
“super-nature”.  Peter Worsley addresses this kind of problem when he writes that the 
natives of Papua New Guinea, for example, do not make this distinction. They have “no 
impermeable membrane between the ‘mundane’ and the ‘magical’, for the primitive is not a 
dualist, operating with a model of ‘two worlds’, nor a schizophrenic operating with different 
principles– empirical and mystical– in different situations” (1968:xxvii). 
The dualistic assumptions of such definitions (nature v. super-nature, mundane v. 
transcendent) emerge from the world-view of Western– more specifically Christian– culture. 
As Roland Robertson observes: 
[a] great analytic difficulty in the sociology of religion is the extent to which our 
basic conceptual apparatus is derived from the doctrines of Christian religions...The 
ideas of religion and religiosity are products of basically Christian thinking because 
of the tensions expressed in Christian doctrine as between on the one hand, social and 
terrestrial reality, and on the other, transcendent spiritual reality (Robertson 
1970:43). 
Robertson, like many of his colleagues, has been dissatisfied with the narrow 
substantive definitions of religion, and has sought to provide one that is more inclusive and 
cross-cultural. He therefore defines religious culture as 
[t]hat set of beliefs and symbols (and values deriving directly therefrom) pertaining 
to a distinction between an empirical and a super-empirical, transcendent reality; the 
affairs of the empirical being subordinated in significance to the non-empirical 
(1970:47 emphasis added).  
Robertson’s use of the term “super-empirical”, instead of “supernatural” is not much of an 
improvement, since it is unclear exactly what the term means. In physics, for example, both 
dark matter and sub-atomic particles are super-empirical theoretical constructs, at least 
insofar as neither may be directly observed. Belief in both, however, have significantly 
re-shaped the way in which physics looks at the empirical, so in that sense, the “empirical 
[is] subordinated in significance to the non-empirical” (1970:47). Therefore, if 
“super-empirical” is to mean anything at all, it probably means something like 
“transcendent”.  Robertson himself seems not entirely unaware of this problem, so he 
qualifies his notion of “super-empirical” by making this very clarification (“transcendent 
reality”). This qualification makes him guilty of the very charge that he brought against 
scholars who write a Christian concept of the “transcendent spiritual world” into a definition 
of religion which purports to be inclusive and cross-cultural. 
Numerous other attempts have been made at defining religion in substantive terms. I 
think it is fair to say, however, that although many of them are useful, none are fully 
adequate, since they are all seen as either too narrow or too broad.  Narrow definitions tend 
to exclude certain phenomena, such as Theravada Buddhism, that the participants by and 
large agree should be included. Others tend to include too much, and make it difficult to 
decide where religion ‘ends’, or how to distinguish it from political ideologies, scientific 
systems, or Girl Guide troupes (Swanson 1960)– things which the participants in the debate 
would agree are not, properly speaking, “religions”.  
In light of these difficulties, it is easy to see why Weber, in a now famous statement, 
declined to define religion. He writes: 
To define “religion,” to say what it is, is not possible at the start of a presentation 
such as this. Definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study 
(1963:1). 
Unfortunately, Weber never finished his study.  He nonetheless worked with an implicit 
(denotative) conception of religion, as evidenced by the books and articles that he wrote on 
the topic (Buddhism, Ancient Judaism, Hinduism, Islam, Puritan and Medieval Catholic 
Christianity). Thus, Roger O’Toole argues that Weber “incorporate[s] a fundamental 
methodological error by assuming implicitly what [he is] not prepared to express explicitly” 
(1984:15).  However this implicit understanding of what “religion” is permeates, not just 
Weber’s work, but the entire sociological debate on the definition of religion. 
One of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, argued that definitional discourse is “peculiar”, in a way that ordinary 
language is not. Critiquing his own early work on logic, he writes 
 (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): “The general form of propositions is: This is 
how things are.”— That is the kind of proposition that one repeats to oneself 
countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature over 
and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at 
it (1968: I § 114). 
Most of the definitional attempts to “define religion” do just this. They do not “trace the 
outline of the thing’s nature”, but trace “round the frame through which we look at it” 
(1968). But the question is, around which frame are we tracing? The sociological discussion 
that I have presented suggests that the debate traces around this denotative definition of 
religion. Indeed, it is only because of this implicit agreement that the debate can take place at 
all.  All of the participants “know” what a religion is (Cargo Cults, Judaism, Theravada 
Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Bahai, etc.), they just cannot agree on a connotative definition 
that will adequately encompass all of the examples of religion that are presumed. This is 
especially true if we transpose complaints about ethnocentrism to complaints that particular 
definitions are too narrow.  That is, ethnocentric definitions exclude, or do not adequately 
include, phenomena that we “know” are religions. 
 
The Genealogy of “Religion” 
 
 Most of the sociological attempts to define religion have involved the search for the essence 
of religion, that necessary condition which enables us to distinguish between religion and 
not-religion. This is due, in part, to the failure to live up to the sociological injunction to 
“always historicize” (cf. Jameson 1981). In The Meaning and End of Religion Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith ([1962] 1978) historicizes religion by providing a genealogy of “religion” 
as a concept in the modern world, and in so doing casts doubt on the very prospects of 
finding such an essence.  Despite, or perhaps because of, his particular theological agenda 
(cf. W.C. Smith 1981), Smith historicizes our conceptions, and demonstrates precisely why 
religion is so difficult to define
iv. Cantwell Smith argues that “religion” is a modern and 
Western phenomenon- at least in its origins. 
Most languages have historically had no word that corresponds with our concept  
“religion” and the equivalent terms in contemporary non-European languages have been 
imported from the West. Even in Europe, for most of its history, the word “religion” (religio) 
meant something very different than it does today
v
.  Smith argues that in early Latin texts, 
religio had to do with specific cultic rites and piety, rather than a “name for a system of ideas 
and beliefs” (1978:40). With the partial exception of ante-Constantinian Christianity, this is 
the sense in which it is used even in the history of the West until it began to change in the 
seventeenth century. 
Smith argues that even at the time of the Reformation, “religio” and its derivatives in 
the European vulgata still meant “piety” or “worship”.  The idea that religion “names a 
system of ideas and beliefs” emerges for the first time in the Enlightenment (1978:40). In 
pamphlet after pamphlet, tract after tract, this new idea was driven home, either by 
polemicists or by apologists of particular traditions. At first, “religion” was something that 
someone else had, whereas the critic had “faith”, “piety”, or in the case of the Lumières, 
“rational thought”. Slowly, however, people began to refer to their own faith as “religion”, 
as they began to defend “true religion” (as a coherent system of beliefs and practices) against 
its critics.  
The late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the birth of two fundamentally 
new uses of the word “religion”. First, was the use of the word “religions” (plural) to denote 
phenomena that were different, but somehow equivalent.  Missions, particularly Catholic 
missions, and the encounter with “other religions” in trade and exploration, led for the first 
time to the concept of the “World Religions” (see also Jonathan Z. Smith 1998). The second 
was the use of “religion” as a generic “essence”. The philosophies of Kant and Feuerbach 
are particularly important here, both as examples of a general Zeitgeist and as important 
influences on the discourse. Feuerbach is particularly important, since he was the first to 
argue that “religion” (in the generic sense) had a single essence, originally in The Essence of 
Christianity ([1854]1957) and several years later in The Essence of Religion ([1846] 1969). 
Religion thus became a single thing for which we may ask the question “What is it? ”. 
“Religion” as we know it emerged out of the encounter with “other” religions 
(pluralism) and in the struggles to free society from the power of the church (differentiation). 
So, while these are two of the major forces in the process of “secularization” (Berger 1967; 
Fenn 1978; Martin 1978), they are also major factors in the genesis of “religion”. Ironically, 
secularization and “religion” are not at all opposites; rather religion emerges out of the 
forces of secularization! 
Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that “religion” is a troublesome construction, one 
that divides people who identify with different “religions”, and that it provides a problematic 
basis for comparative study in the academy. He therefore urges academic specialists to 
abandon the concept altogether. We should rather both study and practice expressions of 
“faith”.  
Although The Meaning and End of Religion (1978) has become something of a 
classic among comparative religionists, most academic students of religion do not seem 
convinced enough to abandon the term altogether. As I see it, his major contribution is to 
offer us a "genealogy of religion" (in a Foucauldian sense), which should make us wary of 
looking for an essence in the first place.  Smith’s argument that “faith” should have priority 
over “religion”, however, does not seem much of an improvement, and looks suspiciously 
like a kind of intellectual Protestant imperialism of all that we once called religion- sola 
fides! Finally, although it is easy to recognize that religion is a troublesome concept, it 
remains the common means of identifying a range of beliefs and practices in the modern 
world – not just for academics, but also for people within and without “religion”. 
 
Non-Essentialist Conceptions of Religion: Wittgenstein’s Language Games   
 
What we need, then, is a non-essentialist way of defining, or conceptualizing “religion”. A 
number of scholars have recently proposed using Wittgenstein's approach to language games 
as a means of conceptualizing religion (Byrne 1988, Saler 1993, Smart 1988).  These 
scholars have suggested that Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances” provides a way 
of defining religion without resorting to a singular (essential) element (gods, the sacred, 
belief in the transcendent) to distinguish religion from not-religion. In this section of the 
paper, I analyze Peter Byrne’s (1988) explicitly Wittgensteinian approach to the question, 
followed by a discussion of Timothy Fitzgerald’s critique of Byrne’s article as a covertly 
essentialist argument. I will then present arguments made by Jonathan Z. Smith (1998) 
Benson Saler (1993) and Timothy Fitzgerald (1996, 1997, 2000) on the topic, and respond 
to them using Wittgenstein’s analysis of language games. 
Peter Byrne argues that a denotative definition of religion should be our starting 
point. That is, we might begin with examples of religion (1988:10). Like Talliaferro (1998), 
he suggests that the most obvious examples of “religion” are Christianity, Judaism, Islam, 
Hinduism and Buddhism.  This list is a kind of shorthand for the kind of phenomena that 
we would identify as religion, for other things that resemble one of these traditions.  As I 
observed earlier, this approximates the consensus that underlies most of the definitional 
debates in the sociology of religion. 
While most of those who have defined religion in the past have been concerned with 
uncovering and identifying the necessary conditions of religion, Byrne proposes a number of 
sufficient conditions for identifying “religion”. But he excludes necessary conditions, since 
these imply an essence of religion
vi
. He writes 
...our list of dimensions and differentiae of religion...allow[s] a number of different 
statements of sufficient conditions for something’s being a religion to be produced, 
since we know that the possession of a significant number of these features in 
varying combinations will be enough to enable something to be a religion (1988:10). 
In order to get this story straight, it is worth quoting Wittgenstein at length on 
“family resemblances”. In this passage on “games”, we could easily exchange “religion” for 
“games”, and the examples of games for examples of religion. In this famous passage, 
Wittgenstein writes: 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call “games”. I mean 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is common 
to them all?— Don’t say “There must be something common, or they would not be 
called ‘games’ ”—but look and see whether there is anything in common to 
all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don’t think, 
but look! Look for example at board games; with their multifarious relationships. 
Now pass to card-games; here you will find many correspondences with the first 
group, but many common features drop out and others appear. When we pass next to 
ball games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. —Are they all 
‘amusing’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and 
losing, or competition between players? Think of [solitaire]. In ball games there is 
winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, 
this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the 
difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like 
ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other 
characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many 
other groups of games in the same way; can see how many similarities crop up and 
disappear. 
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of 
similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities in detail (1968: I §66). 
Wittgenstein thus demonstrates the futility of our searches for an essence of a simple 
concept such as “Game”. There is no essence of Game, but rather a series of “family 
resemblances” (1968: I § 68) between the things we call “games”. Thus, if we are looking to 
define “religion” we should not be looking for the element that distinguishes religion from 
not-religion, but we should explore a set of family resemblances between things that we call 
religion. 
Timothy Fitzgerald (1996), whose arguments in favor of abolishing the concept of 
“religion” altogether I will discuss shortly, has pointed to a number of different problems 
with Byrne’s (1988) family resemblance approach to religion.  Fitzgerald argues that in 
Byrne’s argument, the   
concept of religion must have some essential characteristic, and if it does not, then 
the family of religion becomes so large as to be practically meaningless and 
analytically useless (1996:216). 
Fitzgerald argues that if “religion” is not a hopelessly vague, theological term (and he firmly 
believes that it is), it must have an essence in Byrne’s conception.  Indeed, as Fitzgerald 
observes, the “sacred” repeatedly sneaks back into Byrne’s argument, and effectively 
functions as a necessary condition for distinguishing religion from not-religion. According to 
Fitzgerald, 
The only point that “family resemblances” seems to establish in practical terms is 
that the word religion can be, or rather is, used in many different contexts and does 
not require an essence to give it meaning– except the sacred (1996:227). 
Fitzgerald’s observation that there is an essentialist, reified notion lurking in the background 
of Byrne’s discussion seems warranted. That is, for Byrne, there “really is” such a thing as 
religion– akin to the platonic theory of “Gameness” that Wittgenstein so effectively 
dismantled– it’s just terribly difficult to define. It is a complicated thing that requires a 
flexible approach to adequately “capture” it. Fitzgerald argues that Byrne’s use of 
Wittgenstein is simply a way of “evading the charge of being involved in a meaningless 
activity...” (2000:93). The problem, however, is not with the general conception of 
“language games” - which Fitzgerald does not seem to understand- but that Byrne does not 
push Wittgenstein’s analysis far enough.  
 How then, does Wittgenstein suggest that we discriminate between “games” and 
“non-games”? He writes: 
...how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no 
longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far 
been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word “game”) 
(1968: I §68). 
Thus, there is no “natural” boundary to “religion”, but we can define one if we want to (even 
if the line has been drawn in many ways before).  Jonathan Z. Smith advocates just this 
(‘draw your own boundary’) approach to the definition of religion in a recent article. He 
writes: 
 “Religion” is not a native term; it is created by scholars for their intellectual 
purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order generic concept that 
plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept like 
“language” plays in linguistics or “culture” plays in anthropology. There can be no 
disciplined study of religion without such a horizon (1998:281-2). 
By arguing that “religion” is a second order academic concept, Smith thus provides 
the freedom for academics to define their own terms of reference. There is some advantage to 
this argument, as it removes the question of an essence, or the possibility of seeing it as a 
reality “sui generis”vii (cf. McCutcheon 1997). “Religion” becomes a local language game 
for the academic study of religion, as Lyotard (1984) proposed for all scientific pursuits after 
the death of meta-narratives. In a similar spirit, Roger O’Toole argues that the best yardstick 
to measure a definition of religion is not its “truth”, but rather its usefulness for the sociology 
of religion (1984). Both of these arguments are consistent with Wittgenstein’s notion of 
“language games”, in which the “meaning” of a word is best understood by its use (1968).  
Anthropologist Benson Saler (1993) has developed an approach to the definition of 
religion that has clear parallels with the local language games approach developed by 
Jonathan Z. Smith, and advocated by O’Toole and Lyotard. In his brilliant book, 
Conceptualizing Religion, Saler argues that religion is a Western “folk category” which is 
nonetheless useful in studying “other cultures”. Like Peter Byrne (1988), he argues that we 
can usefully conceptualize religion using a family resemblance approach. However, since 
“religion” is first and foremost a Western folk-category, we should acknowledge the point 
from which “we” begin our analyses- with the prototype of the monotheistic traditions- 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Much like my argument about the implicit conception of 
religion used by sociologists, Saler argues that the history of anthropological attempts to 
understand “other” cultures’ “religions” depends on implicit comparisons between 
Christianity (and its closest relations, Judaism and Islam) and the beliefs, practices and 
rituals of "other" societies. These monotheistic traditions are not just three examples of the 
kind of things we call religion “religion”– as I have been arguing in this paper– they are 
rather prototypes of “religion”.   
While I agree with most of what Saler writes in his book, his conclusion is, I think, 
totally inadequate.  It almost seems as if Saler wants to develop a non-essentialist 
conception of religion for use by 18
th
 century European explorers, philosophers and Christian 
missionaries, or for 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century anthropologists (cf. Byrne 1989; J. Smith 
1998). What Saler is proposing is just how these historical figures decided what is religion 
and what is not religion in "primitive" and “oriental” societies by making explicit 
comparisons with the (Christian) religion of their own social milieu. The difference, of 
course, is that Saler builds a moment of self-reflection into the process, and is fully aware 
that “religion” is a folk category. Whether this approach is adequate for the 21st century is 
another question.   
In contrast to Saler, Smith and O’Toole, for Timothy Fitzgerald (1996, 1997, 2000) 
the way that “religion” is used in local academic language games is precisely the problem. 
He argues that (among comparative religionists) religion is a covertly theological term, 
premised on an ontological category of the sacred. Those who use the term without a covert 
theological agenda (he uses the examples of anthropologists and sociologists) are merely 
misled into using terminology that comes with Judeo-Christian theological and Western 
ideological baggage.  Fitzgerald further argues that the concept “religion” offers nothing of 
value to scholars seeking to understand particular social and cultural formations.  In 
analyses of non-Western societies, like Japan and India, the concept merely distorts our 
analyses by imposing Western concepts onto non-Western “data” (2000:4). Fitzgerald 
argues that the best work done in departments of religious studies is really “cultural studies”, 
or “theoretically informed ethnographic studies” which can do without, and is in fact better 
off without, “religion” at all. He argues that the use of the term “religion” just confuses 
matters, and distracts from fully social analyses.  While I certainly think we should develop 
fully social understandings of religion, I am not sure that we can do without the concept. 
Fitzgerald argues that “religion” distorts the “data” in a way that other concepts do 
not. The “data” is independent and pre-existing. Interpretation can adequately “reflect”, or 
alternately can “distort” the already given “data”viii.   Most (non-positivist) sociologists 
would see this as a somewhat naïve view.  Social theorists writing in the critical tradition 
(Lukacs 1971, Horkheimer and Adorno 1972) or interpretive tradition (Giddens 1976; see 
also Rorty 1991a, Taylor 1985), and even functionalist theorists like Parsons (1968), argue 
that there is no such thing as “data” which is independent of interpretation.  
In his fascinating discussion of rituals, practices and values in Japan, Fitzgerald 
argues that what these are about is not religion, but rather “Japaneseness” (2000:159-218).  
While he is aware that “Japaneseness” is a hegemonic national project, tied to hierarchy, 
deference, and the exclusion of outsiders, he treats “Japan” as a relatively unproblematic 
concept. Nationalists will tell you that “nations” are somehow natural things, but 
non-nationalist students of nations and nationalism will point out that these are “imagined 
communities” (cf. Hobsbawm 1990; Wallerstein 1991 and especially Anderson 1990).  My 
point is obviously not that “Japan” is not real, but that it is no less of a social construct than 
“religion”.  Nations may be imagined entities, but that does not mean that nations are not 
real, or that they do not have real consequences.  The case of India is in some ways even 
more obvious than Japan (see Wallerstein’s article “Does India exist?”(1991)). And yet, 
Fitzgerald has no problem referring to the “sociologists of India”– why not “sociologists [or 
anthropologists, psychologists, historians] of religion”? 
While it is not at all clear that we should want to escape from the discourse of 
religion, it is not even clear that it is possible. Fitzgerald himself does not seem to be able to. 
First, “religion” operates as a background category in his writing. For example, a majority of 
his publications (cited in Fitzgerald 2000) are in journals or books that contain the word 
“religion” or “religious”. This sets the horizon for his discourse, and enables his readers to 
understand that he is talking about “religion”, even if he were able to avoid the “R” word. 
Second, some of his language- discussion about “transcendence” (albeit properly 
de-ontologized) and even more importantly “soteriology” refers (even as it doesn’t refer) to 
religion (cf. 1997:93-95). His language remains within chains of signification that make 
sense only insofar as they are linked to “religion”.  His use of “soteriology”, as if it were a 
“neutral” or “objective” and most importantly “non-theological” word (cf. 2000:121ff) is 
particularly surprising. Look up the term in any dictionary and you will probably find some 
variant of “Theol. The doctrine of Salvation” (Oxford English Dictionary)ix.  
By arguing that we should not use the word “religion” at all in social studies, 
Fitzgerald places religion under erasure (Derrida 1997). By showing that it is almost 
possible to avoid using the term in academic work on “religion”, he sends the concept to the 
cleaners, demonstrating that when we talk about “religion”, we are (really!) talking about 
“culture” (1997:96). Wittgenstein writes, “[s]ometimes an expression has to be withdrawn 
from language and sent for cleaning, - then it can be put back into circulation”(1980:39). It 
seems to me that although the term needs cleaning– and doubtless it will again– as 
academics, we also need it in circulation because “[r]eligion [already] circulates in the 
worldit imposes itself in a particularly palpable manner within the conceptual apparatus of 
international law and global political rhetoric” (Derrida 1999:29). 
“Religion”, Jonathan Z. Smith argues, is an entirely second order academic term 
which we can use as we want. Timothy Fitzgerald argues that it is a second order ideological 
academic term, which we should not use at all.  Benson Saler argues that it is a second 
order “folk category” that is nonetheless analytically useful for studying “other” cultures. I 
think we lose something important in each approaches– ironically in each case– because 
they do not pay enough attention to the social dimensions of the concept. “Religion” is not a 
word that is used primarily, or even most often, by scholars. Non-academics make far more 
use of it, and they do not use it arbitrarily. Nor could they likely (once the word has been 
learned or introduced) avoid using it entirely.  Wittgenstein argued that although we can 
(even arbitrarily) define words how we want to, this is not how we usually know what words 
mean. Pace Benson Saler and Timothy Fitzgerald, it is not just a Western (academic) 
concept– at least not anymore. 
 Wittgenstein asks the question, “How do I know that this color is red?— It would 
be an answer to say: 'I have learnt English' " (1968: I §381). Similarly, we can ask, ‘how do 
I know that this is religion?’— ‘I have learnt English (or French, German, Japanese, Hindi, 
etc.)’.  People use “religion” as part of their “common language game”.  When the census 
or survey researchers ask North Americans, “What is your religion?”, or some other variant 
of this question, people know how to use, and make sense of the word. People will answer 
“Christian”, “Jewish”, “Hindu”, “Buddhist” or “I am an atheist”. Even those who reject the 
identification of their beliefs and practices with “religion” will give an answer that is 
appropriate for the question that is asked of them. People who respond saying “nothing in 
particular” (which still means something), or respond that they are “spiritual” rather than 
“religious”, recognize the relationship between what they are being asked and the answer 
they give. Despite the very significant differences in what they actually believe, they know 
how to use the word “religion”, and recognize the set of phenomena that we are talking 
about.  This is not insignificant. As Wittgenstein puts it, “[e]ssence is expressed in 
grammar” (1968: I §371). Or, as we might now prefer to say, it is expressed in “discourse”. 
The discourse of “religion” is part of the common language game we share.  
Part of Fitzgerald’s critique of “religion” is that it is a Western social construction 
that has no meaning in non-Western cultures, and simply serves to distort our analysis. 
Although we can trace the genealogy of religion to particular social transformations in 
Western Europe during the rise of capitalism and the enlightenment, it has become 
(obviously translated into different languages) a global category.  To suggest, as Fitzgerald 
seems to, that “religion” has no meaning in Japan or India because it is a “foreign” word is 
not quite true. “Religion” has been imposed as an important legal term in more and more 
countries, as states have tried to regulate, separate themselves from, or provide freedom to 
practice it.  “Religion” has become part of the global political-economic discourse, 
enshrined, for example, in article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
x
. This 
has been translated (more or less adequately, no doubt) into more than 300 different 
languages, from Abhkaz to Zulu, suggesting that the concept has a kind of global currency
xi
. 
Not all states around the world have accepted article 18, nor has it been implemented fully- 
but the discourse of religion (and its non-English equivalents) has meaning. It is a concept 
that people know how to use, that is used, and is interpreted. 
  There is clearly variation in the way that the “religion” words are used in different 
contexts
xii
. But the general term is translatable, and people know how to identify what they 
do (or do not do) in relation to “religion”. This is well exemplified by the “World Values 
survey” conducted by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues (2000). This massive research 
project involved surveys conducted in more than 50 countries around the world. In each 
country, respondents were asked what their “religion” is, and whether they identified 
themselves as “religious”.  In the Japanese survey, 60% of those asked to identify their 
religion indicated “none” while the rest identified themselves as members of a particular 
“religion”. While I certainly do not want to oversimplify a complex culture, it does appear 
that “religion” has local meaning, corresponding (albeit in a very rough way) to our concept. 
The fact that this question can be asked at all, and the fact that people know how to respond, 
suggests that this is not a totally meaningless term.  The same is true in India, where the 
survey has been successfully conducted in seven language groups
xiii
.  In response to this 
question, 84% of Indians identified themselves as Hindu, 8% as Muslim, and only 2% said 
that they had no religion. 
Religion may be a Western folk category, as Benson Saler (1993) has argued, but it 
is not just a Western folk category anymore.  Imagine, on the basis of Saler’s definition, 
telling a devout Hindu that what she does is “religion” because it is like the practices Islam, 
or a Buddhist priest that his beliefs are “religion” because they are like Christian doctrine. 
These people can understand their beliefs and practices as part of a family of kinds of things 
that are called “religion” (Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Jainism, Hinduism, etcetera) 
without putting prototypical priority on any one of them. Perhaps the devout Hindu or the 
Tibetan Buddhist priest would even put prototypical priority on his or her own tradition- 
“Christianity is a religion because it is like Hinduism [or Buddhism]”. While most 
anthropologists may begin (or even end) with what they know of “Western religion” 
(Christianity, Judaism and Islam) in studies of “other” cultures, I am not convinced that this 
is really adequate.  
Saler’s (1993) account of the semantics of the religion-as-folk-category seems a bit 
out of date even as it applies to his own (U.S.) culture.  It is indubitably true that- because 
of the hegemony of Christianity in the U.S.- “gods” have seemed to be an essential element 
in the discourse of religion (legal and political, as well as academic). For this reason, he 
suggests that using monotheistic religions as prototypes, is, for the most part, appropriate. 
However, as Saler himself notes, the folk concept in the United States is changing, and 
non-theistic beliefs have, at least since the 1970s, been firmly recognized as “religion” in 
both public and legal discourse (1993: 22; see also McBride 1988).  It neither deals with 
the later development of the folk category in “Christian” countries, nor the spread of the folk 
category elsewhere.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
I have argued that “religion” is a term that denotes a number of traditions, including 
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, etcetera. The “etcetera” is important, 
because it does not claim that this marks the boundaries of religion (there being no such 
thing, in essence), but it provides examples of what we mean by “religion”. I have also 
argued that since there is no “essence” of religion, no such thing as religion, such a 
conception must be non-essentialist. Sociologists of religion agree that religion that is a 
social construction- I have argued that “religion” (as a concept) is, as well.   
This non-essentialist conception of religion casts serious doubts on all reified, 
essentialist conceptions of religion, and should make us extraordinarily cautious about 
attributing predicates to religion, whether as a part of a theological or a critical statement. 
Scholars who fall into opposing camps have traditionally treated religion as an essence, and 
particular traditions as “manifestations” of that essence. Both religionists with a “liberal 
ecumenical theological agenda” (as Fitzgerald puts it) and those who want to develop 
“reductionist” explanations of religion often fall into the same trap of reifying “religion”. 
Thus, if someone claims that religion is the manifestation of a sacred ontology, or that it is 
an illusion, they are turning concepts, relationships and names into things.  
I am by no means suggesting that we are stuck with common sense conceptions of 
religion. Particular (and even essentialist) definitions of religion can be useful, interesting or 
illuminating for particular purposes.  Defining religion in a way that bears little or no 
resemblance to common sense definitions can be important for “recontextualizing” 
phenomena (Rorty 1991), and developing new understandings of various phenomena
xiv
. This 
is an indispensable component of sociological studies– as long as we do not think we are 
defining what religion (really!) is.  
Religion is best identified using a sociologically nominalist family-resemblance 
approach beginning by denoting particular traditions that are “religions”, like Buddhism, 
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and those traditions which resemble them in any 
number of ways (Byrne 1988, Talliaferro 1998). This also allows us to conceptualize 
“quasi-religions” in a fruitful way.  What we conceptualize as quasi-religions are 
phenomena that are usefully interpreted and analyzed using the family of terms and 
categories (sacredness, sacrifice, ritual, salvation, sin, etc.) we have traditionally used to 
understand “religions”xv.  That is, they are not really sort-of-religions- but it can be useful 
to look at them in this way. 
In our analyses of religion we need to pay close attention to the construction, 
reconstructions and transformations of the category of our analysis. While we are 
particularly well advised to be attentive to the stakes of the game within the Academy (cf. 
Fitzgerald 2000, McCutcheon 1997, Wiebe 1999), we need to take careful account of the 
extra-academic politics of category formation and boundary shifts (cf. Beckford 1999). 
Several examples will suffice: There have been numerous political contests over whether 
particular “cults” (such as Aum Shinrikyo) or self-help businesses (for example, 
Scientology) should be classed as “religion” for the purposes of tax exempt status. In times 
of conscription, there is often conflict over what kind of beliefs qualify an individual for 
conscientious objector status. In states that have explicit separation of “church” and state, 
there is often debate about what it is that needs to be separated from the state and what can 
be legally upheld as a belief or practice that qualifies as free from state intervention. These 
conflicts are not fundamentally about representing what a religion is (although they are often 
framed as such)– they constitute religion. There is no “outside” to the politics of naming 
religion- as Wittgenstein put it: “We are struggling with language. We are engaged in a 
struggle with language” (1980:11). 
There is no essence of religion outside the discourse of religion. There is no religion 
per se, pour soi, or an sich. Of course, concepts like “religion” have real social 
consequences, and are important constitutive elements in the construction of global, national 
and local social formations. In that sense, however, there is such a “thing” as religion- or at 
least, it is a term we cannot do without- and we “know” what it means. In this respect, 
Wittgenstein should get the last word: “the best that I can propose is that we should yield 
to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the application of the picture 
goes” (1968: I §373 emphasis original). 
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Notes 
 
                                                   
i I am grateful to Roger O’Toole, John H. Simpson, Andrew Paravantes, Heidi Peterson, Sarah McMillan, Péter Török 
and Tish Langlois for their constructive criticism and helpful conversations. Many thanks also due to my companions 
in the Sunday evening gatherings of critical sociologists in Toronto for listening and providing encouraging, insightful 
critiques. 
ii My discussion will be, of course, highly selective. For a more comprehensive overview of the definition debate, see 
especially O’Toole (1984: chapter 2), and Lambert (1991), but also Blasi (1998) Beckford (1989) and Turner (1991). 
iii The same critiques could be made of the so-called micro-functionalist definitions, such as Geertz (1973), Luckmann 
(1967) and Tillich (1951). See Blasi (1998). 
iv Russell McCutcheon, in his Manufacturing Religion (1997:128), argues that Cantwell Smith’s theological agenda 
undergirds this book, as an attempt to undercut naturalistic explanations of religion. While I have no reason to 
pre-empt “naturalist” or “reductionist” accounts (even if I find both of these terms extraordinarily unfortunate), I 
nonetheless find Smith’s genealogy of “religion” both convincing and useful.   
v Smith provides a history of the way the word religion has been used, rather than offering an argument of what 
religion is based on its etymology (cf. Turner 1991). I share Hans Georg Gadamer's (1998) suspicion of attempts to 
understand the concept religion by an appeal to etymology. In the case of religion, the etymology is at best uncertain 
anyway. 
vi
 I have not outlined Byrne’s sufficient conditions here, since the elements themselves are the least satisfying aspect 
of his argument, and are, in most respects inferior to the essentialist definitions which are routinely used by 
sociologists of religion. Fitzgerald (1996) provides an excellent critique of this aspect of Byrne’s conception of religion. 
vii Sociologists use the term “sui generis” in a different sense, dating back to Durkheim (1915), which always indicates 
something social rather than the trans-social conception of the comparative religionists. Here I am following the usage 
in religious studies. 
viii Fitzgerald is not as explicit as I am putting it here. He would, I suspect not accept this view as I have put it here. I do 
think, however, that this is a mode of thinking that pervades his analysis of this topic. 
ix The O.E.D. proceeds to give two examples from Christian theology. 
x
 “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance” (United Nations [1948] 2000). 
xi Of course it should also be noted that English has itself become a kind of global language, facilitating capitalist 
                                                                                                                                                        
commerce, as well as diplomacy and science. English is an official language in 80 countries in the world, and spoken 
by people in numerous others. 
 
xii I have discussed the concept of “religion” in different cultures and languages with sociologists from a number of 
different societies (Turkey, Hungary, China, Japan, Iran, Nigeria), and although there are significant differences in the 
connotative semantics of the term “religion” as a denotative term in these places, the term is remarkably equivalent.  
xiii I am grateful to Seiko Yamakazi (coordinator of the Japanese survey) and Professor Sandeep Shastri (one of the 
coordinators of the Indian survey) for providing me with the information on this point, as well as to Emi Ooka, who 
discussed the Japanese version of the survey with me. Professor Shastri (personal correspondence) sugge sted that 
while it was somewhat difficult to come up with terms that were strictly equivalent and comparable across linguistic 
groups, the general conception of “religion” is not a completely alien concept. The fact that a question can even be 
asked in a language is itself indicative of what I am pointing to here.  
xiv “What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of 
view” (Wittgenstein 1980:18). 
xv For example: Walter Benjamin on capitalism (1996); Jill Dubisch on health food (1989); Michelle Lelwicka on 
weight-loss (2000); Roger O’Toole on political ‘sects’ (1977); W. Lloyd Warner (1953) on American symbolism; Shils 
and Young on the British Monarchy (1953); Michael Jindra on Star Trek fandom (2000); Joseph Price (2000) on Sport. 
